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Background: Many medical emergency practices are regulated by written procedures that normally provide
reliable guidelines for action. In some cases, however, the consequences of following rule-based instructions
can have unintended negative consequences. The article discusses a case - described on a type level - where
the consequences of following a rule formulation could have been fatal.
Case presentation: A weak and elderly patient has cardiac arrest, and a Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) clause is written
in the patient’s medical record. Paramedics at the scene cannot see that the patient’s general appearance match
conditions which would indicate the DNR clause, so they start cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), and the patient
survives. This turns out to be a crucial decision. The DNR clause is from an earlier bout with serious disease from which
the patient has recovered, against all odds, and someone has forgotten to remove the clause from the medical record.
Analysis: In order to be able to interpret the validity of written guidelines, paramedics and other health workers need
to develop personal skills that transcend the ability simply to follow written instructions. Within traditional virtue ethics,
personal judgment is conceived of as crucial for being able to make ‘good’ autonomous decisions. Virtue ethical
analyses, decision-making abilities and non-technical communication skills are important as conceptual tools
when health workers need to make difficult clinical decisions.
Conclusion: The case study accentuates the significance of prudent judgment in medical practice. In the case
described, the consequence of trusting the written advance directive could have been fatal, but the point is general:
for the purpose of achieving excellent organizational performance, it is insufficient for health workers to rely uncritically
on rules and procedures. Even the clearest rule formulations must be interpreted contextually in order to determine
ethically correct behavior and avoid potential negative consequences that are not in the patient’s best interests.
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Virtue ethicsBackground
The case discussed in this article has a general form, but
it is based on situation described by a participant in an
advanced study program for paramedics working in the
Norwegian national ambulance services. Other students
in the program have also experienced situations similar
in kind to that described below, and they all character-
ized them as some of the worst cases of misinterpretation
they had ever encountered in their professional practice.Correspondence: halvor.nordby@hil.no
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creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/While these specific situations had many idiosyncratic
aspects, they clearly raised the same issues about health
communication and clinical judgment, relevant in a range
of situations. The learning potential is obvious: Learning
how exchange of information sometimes fails can give
health workers a better understanding of how they can
achieve reliable communication [1, 2].
An initiative was made to write an article about the kind
of misunderstanding the paramedic student described, so
that lessons to be learned from his narrative could reach a
broader audience than those who were directly involved.
The paramedic was asked to give his permission to do this,distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://
) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
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said, ‘what happened can be food for thought not only for
paramedics, but for all health workers who are involved
in a crossfire of organizational communication’.
The next section of the article presents the case study as
described by the paramedic. Section three uses the case to
argue for two important points: (1) Written procedures
for patient work must be interpreted contextually – rule
formulations should not be thought of as obvious truths
with straightforward conditions for applications. (2) In
order to avoid potentially negative consequences for
patients, health workers need to secure reliable informa-
tion exchange and exercise good clinical judgment. The
final section of the article discusses these points in the
light of theoretical virtue ethics.
Case presentation
The following description is formulated in completely
anonymous terms. It is based on a real case, but poten-
tially identifiable details have been removed. The case
cannot be connected to a specific place or circumstances
and cannot be traced to the identity of any individual
patient.
An ambulance unit with two paramedics was
summoned to a patient who was reported to have chest
pains consistent with heart attack. The patient was
living in a care home for the elderly, and staff nurses
had made the call for emergency medical assistance.
On-line information, which was sent from the
medical emergency control centre to the ambulance
while it was on its way to the patient, made it clear
that the patient was old and had a terminal disease.
When the paramedics arrived, a nurse came
running and told them to hurry because the patient
had stopped breathing ‘just a couple of minutes ago.’
After being ushered into the patient’s room, the
paramedics found an old patient with cardiac arrest.
A nurse was doing vague attempts of cardiac
compressions, another was checking for signs of
a pulse, and they both expressed relief when the
paramedics arrived. While one paramedic prepared
equipment and the other took over the cardiac
compressions and gave instructions to the nurses,
the nurse who had showed them into the room
told them that the patient’s medical record had
a ‘Do Not Resuscitate’ (DNR) clause. As the
paramedics knew, this is meant to make it clear
that the patient should not be resuscitated if
suffering from cardiac arrest.
The nurse showed the paramedics the DNR clause
by holding up a page from the record where the
clause was handwritten. The nurse claimed not to
know the patient very well, but she knew that thepatient had a serious terminal disease, and she had
found the DNR clause in the patient’s record while
waiting for the paramedics to arrive.
The paramedics had now established that the
patient did not have a pulse. However, the patient’s
skin was still warm, so it was not evident that
resuscitation could not bring the patient back to
life. Moreover, the paramedics were struck by the
patient’s general appearance; it did not suggest that
the patient was in a terminal condition caused by
the patient’s disease. For the paramedics, five
seconds of doubt was all they needed. They thought
it was better to be on the safe side and started CPR
rather than relying on the validity of the DNR clause.
The patient survived, and the paramedics later
learned what had happened: the DNR clause was from
an earlier bout with serious disease. At that time, the
patient was so weak that the patient, together with
close relatives and the patient’s doctor, had deliberated
and agreed to insert the clause in the medical record.
However, the patient did not have a cardiac arrest,
and eventually, against all odds, recovered from the
serious disease.
After being free of symptoms for many years, the
disease was re-diagnosed. This time, however, it had
not developed very much, so when the patient suffered
a cardiac arrest, the disease was less threatening than
the first time. All in all, the DNR clause was far from
justified.
As said above, this case description is based on a particular
narrative presented by a paramedic student in a further
education program, but other students have described
similar forms of misunderstandings. Their narratives have
many idiosyncratic aspects, but they all fall under the gen-
eral type description above – they all involve misinterpret-
ation of DNR clauses in patients’ medical records.
Given the general description of the case described, it
is not relevant to seek informed consent from any per-
sons involved. Furthermore, as no other health workers
are mentioned in the description, it is also detached
from recognizable institutions and health personnel.
Discussion
The fact that the case description cannot be traced to a
specific situation is not crucial from a pedagogical per-
spective. The important point is that the description is a
realistic example of how information exchange can fail.
Through analyzing illuminating examples such as this,
health workers can improve their awareness not only of
why clinical judgment is important, but also why it is
imperative to achieve effective communication [3, 4].
The most striking aspect of the case is that the
consequences for the patient would have been fatal if the
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judgment. Ordinarily, a directive like a DNR clause
provides reliable guidance for action. A DNR clause is an
example of an advance directive. This is, as Capron
([5], p. 261) observes, “a statement made in advance of an
illness about the type and extent of treatment one would
want, on the assumption that one may be incapable of
participating in decision-making when the need arises.”
A DNR clause is normally grounded in a document
stating the reasons why the patient should not receive
CPR in case of cardiac arrest.1 The document is ordinar-
ily based on a decision process involving the patient, the
patient’s responsible physician and relatives of the
patient. It is imperative that the document is signed by
the patient and represents his or her wishes as long as
the patient is autonomous and capable of expressing
informed preferences. As Pietsch and Braun ([6], p.45)
observe:
Professionals assisting an individual with end of life
decision making, including attorneys and health care
providers, have professional responsibilities to
determine the mental status of the individual to
ensure that decisions are informed, voluntary, and not
made under the undue influence of another person.
If the patient is unconscious or has lost the ability to
express autonomous wishes, relatives are normally enti-
tled to make decisions about resuscitation and DNR
clauses.2 If relatives wish to insert a DNR clause in the
patients’ record, there must be convincing reasons why
the wishes of the relatives represent the best interests of
the patient [7]. In future interaction with the patient, it
is imperative that health workers can be confident that
the DNR clause is valid - that the patient would have ac-
cepted the DNR clause if the patient had been capable
of expressing autonomous preferences [8, 9].
Nevertheless, the case above illustrates that there are
always human factors involved in implementing proced-
ural directives like DNR clauses. A DNA clause is an
example of a system-based rule – a written instructive
that health workers should conform to – and the inter-
pretation of any rule can, in principle, be experienced
incorrect in the sense that actions made in accordance
with the rule can be conceived as ethically wrong [10].
Furthermore, instructive rules can be mistakenly applied,
as this almost happened in the given case. This means
that rule formulations must be interpreted contextually.
Written instructions such as a DNR clause should not
be thought of as obvious truths with straightforward
conditions for application. As the case illustrates, this
point is especially important when following a poten-
tially incorrect rule formulation can have serious and
immediate negative consequences for patients.Obviously, this does not mean that health workers are
entitled to overrule instructional directives whenever
they think it is appropriate. The fact that it can be cor-
rect to set aside a written instructional directive in some
exceptional circumstances, does not mean that everyone
should trust their personal judgments if they conflict
with guidelines. The point that the case illustrates is the
much less radical point that instructional directives can
be overruled if there are contextual reasons for thinking
that they are based on a misunderstanding, and if acting
in according with unjustified directives can have negative
consequences for the patient.
This point falls under a more general principle: an
instructional directive can only be valid if the patient
is in the state of ill health described in the directive.
As Pietsch and Braun ([6], p.44) observe, “under normal
circumstances, for the advance directive to be followed,
a physician must first certify that the patient is in a
certain condition or state of incapacity”. In prehospital
work, when physicians are not present in the patient
encounter, paramedics have in principle the same profes-
sional duty to consider the patient’s state off ill health.
However, it takes time to assess the patient parameters
thoroughly, and as Pietsch and Braun ([6], p.44) points
out, “these types of determinations are not easily made
in emergency [work]”. Thus, if uncertainty about a pa-
tient’s condition means that there is uncertainty about
the application of an advance directive that can have
unjustified negative consequences for the patient, it is
better to be on the safe side and follow normal proce-
dures for life sustaining treatment.
Professional autonomy
The importance of individual interpretation in acute
medical practice is normally acknowledged in official
guidelines for how procedures should be applied [8, 9,
11, 12]. Paramedics are to some extent entitled to make
autonomous decisions, but this depends on their formal
level of competence and the structural organization of
the ambulance services in which they work.3 In Norway
it has been decided that where possible, decisions to
terminate CPR in pre-hospital settings should be made
by consulting physicians who are formally responsible
for patients. Paramedics have medical operative manuals
(MOM) where this is stated as a requirement. These
manuals also clarify, to some extent, how paramedics
should make their own judgments about CPR. It is
emphasized that they must consider the best interests of
the patient and make well-founded ethical judgments.4
However, these general competence skills are not con-
nected to procedures, and there are no guidelines about
situations of the above kind – when paramedics are in
doubt about the soundness of a DNR clause. One obvi-
ous reason why there are no detailed rules about this is
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specific rules, it would have been difficult to learn and
remember all of them. The manual would have been a
‘jungle of rules’ that it would be impossible to use effi-
ciently and quickly in real life acute situations. Another
reason why specific rules about DNR clauses and CPR
are not included in the MOM, is that it is difficult to for-
mulate rules that capture all relevant aspects of difficult
situations paramedics can face. Contextual differences
make it difficult to formulate strict rules that always give
the ‘correct’ answer in a type of situation described on a
general level.
There are, at the same time, principles about DNR
clauses that all paramedics should conform to. For
instance, it is insufficient that relatives of the patient
show paramedics a note where the patient states that he
or she does not want to be resuscitated. It is difficult to
know for sure how autonomous the patient was when
writing such a note, and it is possible, at least in
principle, that the individual changed his or her mind
after writing it [5, 9].
If there is reasonable doubt about the patient’s prefer-
ences, then it is better to be on the safe side and do CPR
to avoid potential negative consequences that are not in
the patient’s best interests. This idea of being ‘on the
safe side’ is important. Paramedics and other health
workers should not turn this the other way around. They
should not apply a procedure rule if there is reason to
doubt that it fits the situation they are in, and if apply-
ing it can have unwarranted negative consequences for
the patient.
In situations of the kind described above, it is hard to
see how the paramedics can risk any kind of legal prob-
lem as long as they can defend their actions by appealing
to their clinical judgment. It is important to remember
that the paramedics had to act quickly. There was
not much time for deliberation, and if it had turned out
that the DNR clause was valid, the paramedics could
have stopped CPR once they got more information.
Furthermore, they did not violate the principle that the
possibility of not starting CPR should be discussed with
the most qualified personnel at the scene [9, 12]. They
talked about what they should do as best as they could,
and chose - as an action-guiding principle - to focus on
the idea that CPR should be started when there is a
minimal hope of recovery. Thus, their actions were
grounded in a basic prima facie norm: if there is signifi-
cant doubt, CPR should be started. This point falls
under a more general principle about professional ethics.
Like other health workers, paramedics have a profes-
sional duty to save lives and improve conditions stem-
ming from disease or injury [11, 12].
However, even when this is the aim, the ‘human fac-
tor’ plays a role in interpretation and decision-making[13–16]. The significance of individual reasoning,
contextual interpretation and inter-professional con-
sultation fall under a more general principle, namely,
that health workers – even those who are not formally
responsible for patients – should develop their own
views and present them in decisional processes. Health
workers should not think of themselves as mechanical
pieces in a game and always defend their actions purely
by appealing to literal rule following. It is important to
remember that it is those who are working in the front
line who actually see the patients and their symptoms.
They have the ‘clinical eye’ and make direct observa-
tions. A consulted doctor on the phone does not have
direct experiential knowledge of the patient’s condition
and the context of the encounter.
Theoretical framework
Theoretically, the point about not trusting rules blindly
belongs within virtue ethics, a moral tradition that goes
back to the philosopher Aristotle and his analysis of
what it means to become a competent practitioner [17].
According to virtue ethics, the value of an action de-
pends on the virtues of the person who chooses that ac-
tion. If a person acts out of good attitudes and relevant
competence skills, then his actions are good. If a person
has negative motives, or if he is not competent to make
informed decisions, his actions are not justified ethically.
Davis et al. ([18], p.48) define virtue ethics as a position
that presupposes that the “character and integrity of
health workers as individual moral agents determine or,
at the very least, influence whether ethical problems are
identified and how responses are developed to such
problems in patient care”. Virtue theorists hold that
… [c]haracter and virtue, often considered to be too
subjective, have a place in today’s professional health
care ethics… Descriptions of character and character
traits portray a way of being instead of a way of
acting… [A health worker] who responds to a difficult
patient care situation with respect, patience and attitude
of care is described as a “good” person ([18], p.49).
Aristotle’s philosophy and virtue-ethical assumptions
have been interpreted in different ways, but all virtue
theorists hold that the ability to make sound subjective
judgments is a prerequisite for ‘good’ actions in patient
work [19]. The idea has been that analyses of personal
judgment are needed as alternatives to theories “char-
acterized by a focus on right decisions and acts based
on consideration of more abstract ethical principles”
([18], p.49).
This central assumption in virtue ethics has received
much attention in health care ethics recent years [20–24].
Many have thought that if rigid rules become dominant
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ant interpersonal dimension of professional health-care
practice will be excluded. Thus, as Scott observes, “a
number of contributors to the health care ethics litera-
ture have, for a number of years now, tried to argue
that within the health care and nursing context, a virtue
theory approach is needed at least as a supplement to a
duty- and principle-based approach” ([20], p. 26).
The idea has been that a narrow focus on rules under-
mines health workers’ individual moral responsibility.
Many have argued that rule-based ethics cannot take into
account the clinical judgment, subjective commitment,
responsibility and dedication necessary for consciously
doing something good [17, 18]. The skill of being a
competent practitioner is not equivalent to rule-following;
it is impossible to state rules such that health workers
necessarily display a genuine competence if the rules are
followed [19, 20].
It is easy to understand how virtue ethics is relevant in
the above case. It was the paramedics’ clinical judgment
that saved the situation. Aristotle would say that they
were ‘good’ professionals and did something ‘good’
because they used their skills as practitioners [19]. The
paramedics had respect for the rules, but interpreted
them contextually. Thus, the aim of developing relevant
competence skills should not be understood as an aim of
creating any kind of ‘relativistic’ attitudes – that every-
one should be allowed to overrule procedures like DNR
clauses if they think they have a personal good reason
for doing so (see also above). On the contrary, the rele-
vant competence should help health workers to uncover
misunderstandings about factual matters that can lead to
substantial mistakes. Such a capacity is not in any sense
a ‘subjective’ competence that entitles everyone to place
a parenthesis around guidelines and act in the way they
think is correct. It should rather make it easier to
conform to system-based values, like respecting patient
wishes and sound DNR clauses.
The situation illustrates the important point that
health workers need to find a balance. They need to
learn technical procedures and corresponding technical
skills, but they also need to use their own judgments
when interpreting guidelines. Obviously, developing
technical skills can be challenging, but it is normally
reasonably clear what the aims are. Developing non-
technical skills can be much more challenging. It is less
clear what the pedagogical aims are and how they can
be achieved. Nevertheless, they are crucial for being
able to perform excellently in situations where lives are
at stake [15, 16, 25].
Conclusion
Developing personal judgment is a matter of developing
non-technical skills. These skills are, as Fletcher [26]observes, “sometimes referred to under the general head-
ing of ‘human factors’, but more specifically, as they do
not relate directly to the use of medical expertise, drugs
and equipment (i.e., clinical knowledge and technical
skills), they can be described as non-technical skills”.
It is the technical skills, unfortunately, that get almost
all attention in the pedagogical literature on competence
requirements in emergency medicine [16]. For emer-
gency personnel to develop excellent decision-making
abilities, it is necessary to focus more on the non-
technical skills. This is primarily a matter of developing
communication skills. Paramedics need to learn princi-
ples such as ‘closing the loop’, which involves checking
information, clarifying messages and following up on
issues, actions or projects until they are successfully
completed [2–4]. They also need to develop ethical in-
tegrity and acquire the capacity to make sound clinical
judgments. As the case shows, this is especially import-
ant when the patient’s appearance suggests that a rule
formulation does not lead to actions that are in the
patient’s best interests. In order to ensure good treat-
ment and avoid potentially negative consequences for
patients in acute medical services, it is necessary to
focus on all these abilities in the education and training
of emergency personnel. As the case discussed in this
article illustrates, the abilities can be of crucial import-
ance in patient work.
Consent
The participant in the advanced further education course
for paramedics who provided narration to this article is
aware of his contribution and has given informed consent
to publication.
Endnotes
1The reason why it is necessary to use the qualification
‘normally’ is that it has been extensively documented
that patients’ preferences and the role they have in end-
of-life decision processes are shaped by cultural frame-
works [27–30]. Furthermore, advanced directives are
sometimes based on oral consent, for instance when an
autonomous patient is not capable of reading or signing
a document [5, 8]. However, the general practice of
inserting DNR clauses in patients’ medical records have
been implemented in public health services on a large
scale, and are highlighted in international paramedics
textbooks that are used in education and training of
emergency personnel [11, 12].
2A qualification similar to the point made in endnote 1
above applies. The role of relatives’ preferences depends
on cultural frameworks [6, 27–29]. In some countries
there is a strong tradition for involving relatives of pa-
tients in decision processes concerning the patient [27,
28]. In other countries (like Norway) relatives are only
Nordby BMC Medical Ethics  (2015) 16:46 Page 6 of 6involved in end of life decision process if the patient is
incapable of expressing autonomous beliefs. Discussing
these cultural differences in detail fall outside the main
focus of this article. My aim here is to make a general
point about the importance of contextual interpretation
of procedural directives.
3There are no international standards for how the
term ‘paramedic’ should be used. In some countries a
paramedic needs to have a bachelor degree from univer-
sity levels, in other countries this is not required. These
differences are not crucial for the arguments here.
4The specific formulations differ from area to area. For
instance, the MOM in the capital area (Oslo) is not the
same as in northern parts of Norway. The lack of na-
tional standards is unfortunate for many reasons, but fo-
cusing on this falls outside the main focus of this article.
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